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The Puzzle of Existence: Why Is There Something Rather Than Nothing?, edited 
by Tyron Goldschmidt. New York: Routledge, 2013. 295 pages. $125 (hard-
cover), $98.77 (Kindle).
KENNETH L. PEARCE, Valparaiso University
This book contains fifteen original essays addressing issues relevant to the 
question, “why is there something rather than nothing?” (henceforth, “The 
Question”). As is appropriate for such a topic, the essays contain interest-
ing and original reflections on a wide variety of subjects in metaphysics, 
philosophy of religion, and philosophy of science. Most of the essays are 
accessible to non-specialists, including advanced undergraduate students. 
Especially to be commended in this respect is Matthew Kotzen’s essay, 
“The Probabilistic Explanation of Why There is Something Rather Than 
Nothing” (chapter 13), which does an excellent job of introducing some 
highly technical issues in the theory of probability to a non-specialist au-
dience. This book would be an excellent choice for graduate or advanced 
undergraduate seminars covering modality, explanation, the Principle of 
Sufficient Reason, and/or the cosmological argument from contingency, 
if only it were not so prohibitively expensive. It is to be hoped that a less 
expensive paperback will become available soon.
Rather than attempting to address every issue that appears in this book, 
this review will focus primarily on those that bear on the cosmological 
argument from contingency. Modern formulations of The Question have 
their origin in Leibniz who argues that the Principle of Sufficient Reason 
requires the existence of a being (God) who stands outside the series of 
contingent things and makes that series actual. An answer to The Ques-
tion along these general lines is defended by Timothy O’Connor (chapter 
2). As O’Connor acknowledges at the outset (23), his project differs from 
traditional natural theological projects only in its commitment to epis-
temic humility. One of the forms O’Connor’s intellectual humility takes is 
his admission that theism is unable to provide any kind of detailed expla-
nation of why the world is as it is. Nevertheless, O’Connor believes he can 
show that theism has a significant advantage over naturalism, for, given 
theism, we have at least some conception of how a full answer to The 
Question would have to go: it would appeal to God’s reasons, intentions, 
and so forth. On naturalism, we cannot see how The Question could possi-
bly have an answer at all. Thus, despite the lack of a detailed explanation, 
theism has a major explanatory advantage over naturalism.
In the essay which follows, Graham Oppy disputes O’Connor’s claims. 
According to Oppy, theism has no explanatory advantage, for whatever 
the causal structure of a theistic world, a naturalistic world with that struc-
ture can just as easily be imagined. Thus, for instance, if we can start from 
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a necessary God bringing the universe into existence, we can just as easily 
start from a necessary Singularity bringing the universe into existence. 
Furthermore, if theism lacks an explanatory advantage, then it appears 
that naturalism is to be preferred, since naturalism is superior to theism 
in parsimony.
Oppy’s key point is that positing God as one more “billiard ball” in the 
sequence of causes studied by science yields no explanatory advantage. 
Surely he is right about this. Insofar as O’Connor is considering God as a 
cause among causes, Oppy’s critique is devastating.
This difficulty was, however, already recognized by classical theistic 
metaphysicians, and is precisely the point of the traditional distinction be-
tween primary and secondary causation: God is not a cause among causes, 
but rather stands outside the secondary causal sequence and makes that 
sequence, rather than another, actual. As has long been recognized, this 
is consistent with the sequence of secondary causes being either finite or 
infinite, for even if there was an infinite sequence, we could still ask, “why 
that sequence and not another?” and we could still answer, “because God 
so chose.” (O’Connor makes this point on p. 26.)
The key challenge for the theist at this point is to render intelligible 
the notion of primary causation. If God’s creation does not involve the 
sort of causal relation that obtains among (literal or metaphorical) billiard 
balls, then what is it? This is not the place to explore this question, but it 
is worth noting that, in recent years, analytic metaphysicians have come 
to recognize that there are a variety of metaphysical relations, apart from 
ordinary causation, that can figure in different sorts of explanations. These 
are what Karen Bennett calls “building relations”: composition, constitu-
tion, realization, and so forth.1 Given a prior commitment to a plurality of 
such relations, it is perhaps not too great a cost for the theist to introduce 
one additional such relation, primary causation. The introduction of such 
a relation would provide the theist with an explanation of why this contin-
gent causal sequence obtains rather than another.
Can the naturalist do the same? Two of the essays in Puzzle do advo-
cate naturalistic, non-causal answers to The Question. In chapter 14, Marc 
Lange argues that there might be reasons within science for supposing that 
the existence of something rather than nothing is naturally (i.e., physically 
or nomologically) necessary, even if it is not metaphysically necessary, and 
that this would explain why there is something rather than nothing. In 
chapter 15, Stephen Maitzen argues that The Question can be answered by 
citing any one of the myriad facts which constitute the fact that something 
exists. Thus, he proposes, there is something rather than nothing because 
there are penguins.
If the theist really could explain something the naturalist could not, 
would theism then automatically be better than naturalism? There are at 
1Karen Bennett, “Construction Area (No Hard Hat Required),” Philosophical Studies 15 
(2011), 79–104
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least two reasons one might think not. First, perhaps not all legitimate ex-
planatory demands can be met. Second, perhaps the explanatory demand 
embodied in The Question is somehow illegitimate.
The first point of view is defended by Shieva Kleinschmidt in chap-
ter 4. Kleinschmidt criticizes recent arguments for the conclusion that the 
Principle of Sufficient Reason is presupposed by our explanatory practices 
and argues instead that our practices are better explained by supposing 
that we take explanatory comprehensiveness to be a theoretical virtue like 
simplicity. If this is so then, even if theism has an advantage in explanatory 
comprehensiveness, we will have to ask whether this advantage might be 
counterbalanced by defects elsewhere.
The second point of view is defended, in different ways, by Jacob Ross 
(chapter 5) and Kris McDaniel (chapter 16). A presupposition of any “why” 
question is that there is some fact to be explained. Where there is no such 
fact, the question is ill-posed. On one interpretation of The Question Ross 
considers, the explanandum at issue is the conjunction of all true contin-
gent propositions. Ross defends an account of propositions which requires 
that, for every conjunction, there exists a set of its conjuncts and argues 
that there is a proper class of true contingent propositions. Hence, if The 
Question is asking for an explanation of the conjunction of all contingent 
truths, it is ill-posed, for there is no such fact to be explained. According 
to McDaniel, The Question is highly ambiguous because there are many 
different modes of being and, for any of those modes of being, one might 
be taken to be asking why there are things that enjoy that particular mode 
of being. However, McDaniel argues, The Question presupposes that 
possibly, there is nothing, and there may be modes of being, such as what 
McDaniel calls the “possibilist” mode of being, to which modal concepts 
cannot be applied.
McDaniel’s theory of modes of being is most interesting and, certainly, 
if that theory is correct a major reorientation of our thinking about The 
Question will be required. However, it is far from clear that McDaniel 
is correct in holding that The Question presupposes that possibly, there 
is nothing and is ill-posed if that claim is false or ill-formed. After all, it 
makes perfectly good sense to ask why the Incompleteness Theorem is 
true, even if one knows that the Theorem is necessarily true.
Ross also considers a second interpretation of The Question, on which 
it is well-posed but can be answered without appeal to a necessary being. 
On this interpretation the explanandum is the claim that some being exists. 
If this is not to be a trivial question that can be answered, in Maitzen’s 
way, by citing the existence of penguins, this must be due to some general 
principle about explanation which would require that, in explaining why 
there are any Fs at all, we must appeal to some being which is not itself 
an F. However, it seems that this principle would entail the falsity of the 
Principle of Sufficient Reason, and so end up undermining the argument 
from contingency. In order to explain why there are any beings at all, one 
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would have to appeal to a being which is not a being, which is a contradic-
tion. As a result, that fact must lack an explanation.
Ross suggests a different moral: the defender of the Principle of Suf-
ficient Reason must reject the existence of a kind or set containing all 
beings. Furthermore, Ross goes on to argue, the defender of the Principle 
of Sufficient Reason should reject the existence of a kind or set contain-
ing all contingent, concrete beings. As a result, the Principle of Sufficient 
Reason actually precludes the existence of an explanatory regress-stopper 
of the sort the argument from contingency envisions. For every kind or set 
of beings, there must be some further being outside to explain why there 
are any members of that set. This implies a proper class of beings and an 
infinite regress of explanatory relations.
In the essay following Ross’s, Christopher Hughes argues that the 
general strategy followed by Ross cannot escape the argument from 
contingency. As Hughes sees it, arguments from contingency have two 
key premises: a contingency-dependence principle (which may or may not 
be derived from the Principle of Sufficient Reason), which states that 
every contingent thing or collection of contingent things must depend on 
something outside itself, and “the existence of some sort of ‘sufficiently 
inclusive’ being” (100–101), such as The World or the conjunction of all 
contingent true propositions or the kind or set of all contingent beings. 
According to Hughes, the second assumption—the one Ross challenges—
can in fact be dispensed with by the device of plural quantification. Thus 
the sufficiently inclusive being premise would be unneeded if the contin-
gency-dependence principle were formulated as follows:
If any being is contingent, or any beings are (all) contingent, then there is 
some being outside that being or outside (all) those beings, on which that 
being or at least one of those beings depends (102).
It is, however, unclear whether this makes any difference, for if one is 
inclined to deny the existence of a set of all contingent beings, one may 
equally well reject the (plural-quantified) claim:
There are some beings such that every contingent being is among them.
Perhaps this plural-quantified statement is more plausible than its set-
theoretic or mereological relatives, but Hughes has not given an argument 
for that assessment.
Although I have focused here on issues relevant to the argument from 
contingency, this volume also contains interesting discussion of other im-
portant issues in metaphysics, including articles by David Efird and Tom 
Stoneham (chapter 9), John Heil (chapter 10), E. J. Lowe (chapter 11), and 
Gonzalo Rodriguez-Pereyra (chapter 12) on the metaphysical possibility 
of an empty world. Metaphysicians, philosophers of religion, and philoso-
phers of science will all find much to interest them in this volume.
